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THE NARROWEST AND MOST OBVIOUS LIMITS: 
APPLYING FAIR USE TO APPROPRIATION ART 
ECONOMICALLY USING A ROYALTY SYSTEM 
Brittani Everson+ 
“All artists steal; but the truly original artist repays a thousandfold.”1 
 
The intersection of art and law has confounded courts for centuries.2  In one 
of the most famous copyright cases of the twentieth century, Justice Holmes 
cautioned that judges, trained principally in law, should refrain from making 
judgments about the aesthetic value of art.3  Scholars of law and art alike have 
written extensively on the ways in which art and law are distinct and should not 
mix.4  However, there are many instances in which art and law must intersect, 
most notably when the law seeks to protect and promote the arts by granting 
exclusive copyrights and making allowances for fair use.5 
In the United States, legal protection of art is rooted in the Constitution, which 
empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2010, Smith College.  The author would like to thank Professor Susanna Fischer and the members 
of Catholic University Law Review for their help and guidance.  The author would also like to 
thank her family, especially her mother, Cheryl Everson-Mack, grandmother, Mary Henson, and 
aunt, Dora Adams, for providing love and support every step of the way.  A special thanks to 
Danielle Riley for her unfailing love and encouragement.  This is in memory of Brenton and Louis 
Everson. 
 1. A sentiment traditionally attributed to the architect, Le Corbusier.  See Henry Lydiate, 
Appropriation Art and Fair Uses: Cariou v. Prince, ART MONTHLY, May 2009, at 41. 
 2. E.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); see Christine 
Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 819–39 (2005); Anne Jamison, Collaboration v. 
Imitation: Authorship and the Law, 18 LAW & LIT. 199, 203 (2006). 
 3. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.  Justice Holmes remarked: 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest 
and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned 
the new language in which their author spoke.  
 Id. 
 4. See Farley, supra note 2, at 811–13 (discussing the problematic nature of the rigid 
objectivity that judges must impart in their judgments about art, which is inherently subjective); 
William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 
9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (noting that artists view copyright law as an impediment to their 
creativity). 
 5. See John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 
13 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 103, 104 (1988). 
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respective Writings and Discoveries.”6  Pursuant to this power, Congress passed 
the Copyright Act of 1976, which gave holders of copyrights exclusive use of 
copyrighted material, including the rights of reproduction, adaptation, 
publication, performance, and display.7  Additionally, as a tool to combat 
copyright infringement claims, the Copyright Act codified the judicial doctrine 
of fair use, which permits individuals other than the copyright holder to use 
copyrighted works in limited circumstances.8  Copyright law aims to balance the 
private reward given to copyright holders with the benefit the public accrues 
from access to intellectual property.9 
Judges must find equilibrium between judging the aesthetic value of art, an 
inquiry that is subjective and vulnerable to the influence of a judge’s art 
knowledge, aesthetic preferences, and biases, and objectively ruling on the use 
of copyrighted works.10  As art forms change, this has become progressively 
difficult.11  Courts are increasingly asked to make rulings on art that they do not 
understand or consider as art.12  This is particularly the case when courts deal 
                                                 
 6. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 7. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1990) (stating that the text of the Constitution implies that exclusive 
intellectual property rights “exists only by virtue of statutory enactments”).  This right is limited to 
protection of expressions and does not extend to protection of “idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 8. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  Although fair use was codified in Section 107 in 1976, courts 
have long recognized and applied the doctrine.  S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 61 (1975).  But see WILLIAM 
F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE, § 2:1 (2013 ed.) (concluding that fair use was not codified but 
instead statutorily recognized because the Copyright Act does not give a finite definition of fair use 
and instead offers factors to be considered at the discretion of the court). 
 9. Carlin, supra note 5, at 104; see Jamison, supra note 2, at 202 (arguing that this analysis 
takes into account both financial and moral costs and benefits); see also Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that Congressional intent of the 
Copyright Act was to strike the balance between society’s interest “in the free flow of ideas” and 
the ability of creators to “control and [exploit] their creations”); Leval, supra note 7, at 1111 
(finding that the sole goal of copyright law is to stimulate creativity for the greater benefit of the 
people). 
 10. See Leval, supra note 7, at 1107 (stating that fair use opinions are inconsistent and “result 
from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns”); Sherri Irvin, Appropriation and Authorship In 
Contemporary Art, 45 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 123, 134 (2005) (recognizing that defining art is more 
difficult when confronted with all of the developments made by contemporary artists). 
 11. See infra Part I.E (discussing the application of copyright protection to appropriation art). 
 12. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, 
vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
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with “appropriation artists”13 who skew the traditional art goal of originality14 
and seek to express ideas by borrowing and repurposing images from pop 
culture, advertisements, news media, and other artists.15 
Appropriation artists incorporate borrowed images and found objects in varied 
ways: making unaltered carbon copies, incorporating the images in collages, and 
transforming the images through addition, distortion, and camouflage.16  Courts 
have dealt with cases involving appropriation artists by prioritizing the first 
factor of the fair use inquiry and by allowing their visual experience of the art 
and understanding of the genre of appropriation art to inform their rulings.17  
Scholars have frequently noted the problems that accompany rulings based on 
                                                 
 13. Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post Modernism, 
11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1992) (asserting that appropriation art “represents the most 
radical challenge to the copyright laws to date”).  Within this Comment the term “appropriation 
artist” refers specifically to visual artists who work in the mediums of painting, drawing, sculpture, 
printing, and still photography.  See 17 U.S.C. §101 defining “work of visual art” as “a painting, 
drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer 
that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author;” see also Leval, supra note 7, at  
1128–29 (suggesting that it may be necessary to implement an entirely new form of copyright law 
to address the unique issues artists face). 
 14. See Irvin, supra note 10, at 136 (positing that “even innovation is not built in to the very 
idea of art” and explaining that appropriation art does not strive to be original); see also Greenberg, 
supra note 13, at 1 (arguing that contemporary artists constantly challenge the notion that copyright 
law uses to categorize art); Laura Gilbert, No Longer Appropriate?, ART NEWSPAPER (May 9, 
2012), available at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/No-longer-appropriate/26378 
(reporting that appropriation artist, Sherri Levin, felt that the point of her art was to infringe and 
challenge notions of authorship). 
 15. Carlin, supra note 5, at 108–09; Barbara Pollack, Copy Rights, ARTNEWS, Mar. 2012, 
at 76 (concluding that “‘[a]ppropriation’ covers a broad array of practices—reworking, sampling, 
quoting, borrowing, remixing, transforming, adapting”); see also Jamison, supra note 2, at 202 
(commenting on the troublesome place of appropriation art in copyright law, which distinguishes 
only between a true owner and one who is not a true owner). 
 16. See, e.g., Carlin, supra note 5, at 136–37 (describing techniques used by appropriation 
artists, Levine and Bidlo).  For example, artist Sherri Levine gained fame and legal trouble after 
displaying her “re-photographs,”photographic prints that were exact replicas of photographs 
previously taken and published by another artist, Edward Weston.  Id.  Similarly, Jeff Koons was 
sued for copyright infringement after creating sculptures based on a copyrighted photograph.  
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006).  Koons altered the original image by changing 
the medium of representation from photography to sculpture and adding several details and color 
choices not included in the original photograph.  Id. at 248. 
 17. See Greenberg, supra note 13, at 1–2 (explaining that the process of legal copyright 
protection requires an aesthetic evaluation of the work and arguing that visual artist are unique and, 
therefore, deserve their own unique copyright analysis); Farley, supra note 2, at 805–18 (providing 
examples of judges making subjective aesthetic determinations in copyright cases); see also VILIS 
R. INDE, ART IN THE COURTROOM 20 (1998) (noting that the artists themselves believe that “the 
creative aspect of art goes far beyond the visual elements of art”). 
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the aesthetic value of the alleged infringing works.18  However, the judiciary has 
historically been reluctant to judge the aesthetic value of art.19 
The Second Circuit confronted this issue in Cariou v. Prince.20  For six years, 
the American photographer Paul Cariou photographed the religious practices, 
culture, and tropical landscapes that characterized the lives of Jamaican 
Rastafarians.21  In 2000, his work was published in Yes Rasta, an almost two 
hundred page photographic essay.22  In 2007, Richard Prince, a well-known 
appropriation artist,23 exhibited and sold prints of a collection of paintings and 
collages that incorporated Cariou’s photographs.24  Cariou challenged Prince’s 
use of the copyrighted photographs.25  Through visual observation of the 
artworks, the court found that Prince had created a work of art that was visually 
different and that evoked a meaning completely separate from the photographs 
taken by Cariou.26 
The trend towards prioritizing visual transformation in copyright law cases 
over all other considerations affects appropriation artwork because the 
appropriation artists use copyrighted material unconventionally.27  This allows 
courts to resort to an aesthetic analysis that is based solely on the court’s 
experience with and knowledge of art and the work in question, and that is 
subject to potential biases.28  This approach has resulted in a modern day “I know 
it when I see it” approach for determining when copyright infringement occurs.29  
Furthermore, the judicial reliance on aesthetics and the artist-defendants’ own 
                                                 
 18. See, e.g., Farley, supra note 2, at 805–18 (identifying problems that accompany these 
judicial rulings); Greenberg, supra note 13, at 1 (same). 
 19. See Farley, supra note 2, at 807; Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts 
in Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 485, 518–28 (2010). 
 20. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013).  This 
case was recently settled.  See Brian Boucher, Art in America Landmark Copyright Lawsuit Cariou 
v. Prince is Settled, ART IN AMERICA (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://www.art 
inamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/landmark-copyright-lawsuit-cariou-v-prince-is 
-settled/. 
 21. Id. at 698. 
 22. Id. at 699. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  For example, Prince took Cariou’s black and white photograph of a young man 
standing next to shrubbery, spray painted the subject’s eyes and inserted a photograph of a blue 
electric guitar so that the subject appeared to be playing the instrument.  Id. 
 25. Id. at 698. 
 26. Id. at 706. 
 27. See Irvin, supra note 10, at 125–27 (positing that while traditionally artists were held 
“responsible for every aspect of their creation” but appropriation artists are not responsible for 
every aspect of their art because “they substitute the voices of others for their own”).  See Jamison, 
supra note 2, at 202–03 (discussing the inability of copyright law to see past the idea of one author). 
 28. Farley, supra note 2, at 854 (concluding that the ability of judges to consider works of art 
is subject to “deeply subjective, highly personal, unanalyzed feelings that an object is or is not art”). 
 29. This approach is akin to the one use in Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio.  
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding that illegal 
pornography could be identified by simply viewing it). 
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conception of their work has led to inconsistent rulings in which one court will 
see transformation in a piece of art while another court considering the same 
piece does not.30  As the use of copyrighted works becomes more common in all 
genres and technological developments make appropriation of images easier, 
courts must wrestle with the copyright questions in unconventional mediums.31 
This Comment explores the development of the fair use defense and its 
application to cases involving appropriation artists.  Part I examines the history 
of fair use, including its beginning as a judicial doctrine, its codification in the 
Copyright Act, and the most recent Supreme Court cases interpreting the 
defense.  Next, Part I outlines how courts employ a four-factor analysis in fair 
use cases, highlighting the initial application of those factors in cases involving 
visual appropriation artists. Part II analyzes the trend of prioritizing the aesthetic 
transformative value when dealing with visual artists through a discussion of the 
Cariou decision.  This section argues that this focus on aesthetics is contrary to 
the history of court treatment of visual art and the overall goal of the Copyright 
Act.  Part III offers a solution for solving copyright infringement cases involving 
appropriation artists based on the economic rationales for copyright law, 
concluding that the most effective way to judge cases involving appropriation 
artists is by applying an economic analysis.  This economic analysis permits fair 
use when substantial commercial use has not been made of copyrighted material 
and institutes a royalty system when commercial use has been identified.  This 
proposal allows courts to forgo aesthetic evaluation of appropriation artists. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW PROTECTION OF CREATORS AND THE 
FAIR USE DOCTRINE 
A.  The Complicated Purpose of Copyright Law 
Courts consider actions for infringement in light of the purpose of copyright 
law.32  Judges have difficulty reaching consistent decisions because the 
underlying purpose of copyright is so controversial.33  Simply stated, copyright 
                                                 
 30. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, vacated 
in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
 31. See Randy Kennedy, Apropos Appropriation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, at AR1 
(commenting that “art lawyers say that legal challenges are now coming at a faster pace, perhaps 
in part because the art market has become a much bigger business”); Pollack, supra note 15 
(reporting that an appropriation artist stated that “technology has really opened up the techniques” 
and as a result artists have easy access to “computers, scanners and Google” the idea of a “digital 
culture”); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430–31 (1984) 
(pointing out the relationship between copyright law and technological development); Carlin, supra 
note 5, at 106 (finding that there is an increasing use of technology in “mainstream cultural 
expression” that incorporates borrowed text and images and “re-using original themes”). 
 32. See Howard B.  Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding 
the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1120 (1983) (noting that the goal 
of copyright law underlies many judicial decisions). 
 33. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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law’s purpose is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”34 which 
is accomplished by giving creators limited monopolies through the grant of 
exclusive copyrights.35  These monopolies stimulate creation by rewarding 
originators for their efforts.36  Although the general public reaps benefits from 
the creativity resulting from these monopolies,37 controversy arises when the 
monopolies are seen as an impediment to creativity.38 
Scholars offer various justifications for granting exclusive copyrights that 
conflict when copyright law is applied.39  The first justification elevates the 
rights of the public to access intellectual property and positions copyright law as 
a “necessary evil” that is permissible only because of the economic incentives it 
offers to creators and the benefit it provides to the public.40  The second 
justification is that copyright law is simply an extension of an author’s natural 
property rights and that the protection of authorship is the ultimate goal of 
copyright law.41  The tension between these constructions is the central concern 
of fair use, a concept that can be distilled down to a choice between honoring an 
author’s property rights and giving the public the benefit of access.42 
                                                 
 34. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 36. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545–46 (1985) 
(stating that copyright owners should receive “a fair return for their labors”); Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 
(deciding that copyright law must spur creation and provide “a special reward” for creators); see 
also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182–83 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that the purpose of 
copyright law is to reward creativity for the public’s benefit). 
 37. See CR1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT  
§ 1.03[A] (2000). 
 38. Leval, supra note 7, at 1109 (warning that copyright monopolies could “strangle the 
creative process”); see also Greenberg, supra note 13, at 32–33 (arguing that copyright law can 
discourage creation when new creators are unable to access the ideas of previous inventors). 
 39. Abrams, supra note 32, at 1120–21. 
 40. Id. at 1120–21 (concluding that the cost of exclusive copyrights is a burden on the public 
but is justifiable because of the benefits that creators and the public receive); NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 37, at § 1.03[A] (arguing that without a benefit to the public, granting exclusive 
copyrights would be unwarranted).  But see Frank J. Lukes, Comment, The Public Good v. A 
Monetary Profit: The News Organizations’ Utilization of the Fair Use Doctrine, 11 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 841, 844 (2012) (noting that “the primary purpose of copyright law is not 
to reward the author for his work” but is instead to promote the public good). 
 41. See Abrams, supra note 32, at 1122; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, at  
§ 106[A] (hypothesizing that creative works could be considered private property and fit into the 
natural right concept underlying property law). 
 42. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006).  Fair use was developed to aid in 
implementing the purpose of copyright law.  See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013) (stating that fair use is necessary to obtain the goals of 
copyright); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(finding that fair use must conform with the goals of copyright law); Brownmark Films, LLC v. 
Comedy Partners, 800 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1000 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (finding that fair use advances the 
purpose of copyright law), aff’d, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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B.  The Beginnings of Fair Use: A Judicially Created Doctrine 
The doctrine of fair use has been called “the most troublesome in the whole 
law of copyright.”43  As an exception to an exclusive copyright, fair use allows 
the use of copyrighted works in limited situations by entities other than the 
copyright holder.44  Prior to the doctrine’s codification in the Copyright Act of 
1976, judges articulated varying criteria to identify fair uses, always considering 
the economic goal of copyright law.45 
Building on English case law established under the Statute of Anne,46 Folsom 
v. Marsh created the framework for fair use analysis in America.47  In that case, 
the court had to decide whether a bibliography entitled, “Life of Washington” 
featuring the writings of President George Washington infringed on a previously 
published encyclopedia by using the same letters.48  Focusing on the materials, 
the court inquired about the nature, extent, and value of the materials used by 
both parties and whether those materials had common sources.49  The court next 
looked towards the purpose of each work and the authors’ objectives in creating 
their work.50  At minimum, the court sought to ensure that the subsequent work 
did not “supersede” the original, meaning that the secondary work did not 
                                                 
 43. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 44. Lukes, supra note 40, at 846–48. 
 45. See S. REP. No. 94-473, at 61 (1975) (stating that fair use as a defense in copyright actions 
“has been raised as a defense in innumerable copyright actions over the years, and there is ample 
case law recognizing the existence of the doctrine applying it”). 
 46. Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709 8 Ann., c. 19; See PATRY, supra note 8, at 
§ 1:2 (tracing the roots of American copyright law to the English Statute of Anne, the sole purpose 
of which was to correct the damage done to the London book market by unauthorized copying); 
see also Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (2011) 
(hypothesizing that early English case law and modern American copyright law have much in 
common).  The Statute of Anne gave book printers and authors an exclusive monopoly over their 
works, in hopes to protect those artisans from financial ruin.  See Leval, supra note 7, at 1108–09. 
 47. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. mass. 1841) (No. 4901); Sag, supra note 46, 
at 1377. 
 48. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344–45.  In the oft quoted majority opinion, Justice Story remarked: 
[t]he question of piracy, often depend upon a nice balance of the comparative use made 
in one of the materials of the other; the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus 
used; the objects of each work; and the degree to which each writer may be fairly 
presumed to have resorted to the same common sources of information, or to have 
exercised the same common diligence in the selection and arrangement of the materials. 
Id. at 344. 
 49. Id. at 348.  Other cases are instructive on this point.  See Henry Holt & Co., to Use of 
Felderman v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (concluding that 
three sentences from a copyrighted book were a small percentage but represented the essential, 
valuable portions of the original work).  However, some scholars have criticized Folsom’s 
expansion of copyright law to include tangible ideas like the value of each work.  See Sag, supra 
note 46, at 1373. 
 50. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348. 
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“prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits” of the original.51  The court found 
that copying the essence of the original work produced the unfair use of the 
work.52 
The principles identified by Justice Story in Folsom were a talisman repeated 
by many courts, effectively becoming the most prevalent fair use dogma.53  
Several courts expanded on the Folsom inquiry, each focusing on the use and 
economic protection of copyright holders.54  These courts recognized the 
importance of allowing fair use for criticisms and parodies.55  Additionally, 
courts focused on the economic damage an original work may suffer,56 some 
courts concluding that actual damage need not be shown.57  Overall, judges 
articulated principles that recognized justifiable uses of original material while 
at the same time preventing injury to original authors by recognizing the value 
and labor expended by original authors.58 
C.  Codification of Fair Use in the Copyright Act of 1976 
The first American Copyright Act was enacted in 1790 as a way to insure 
adherence to the Constitutional mandate of protection and promotion of 
innovation in the arts and sciences.59  When the Copyright Act was amended in 
                                                 
 51. Id. (“If so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors 
of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is 
sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto.”); see also Mathews Conveyer Co. v. 
Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943) (finding plaintiff’s injury to be “infinitesimal” 
because plaintiff had hundreds of sketches and the suit only dealt with two of them). 
 52. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348. 
 53. See, e.g., Mathews Conveyer, 135 F.2d at 84-85; Henry Holt, 23 F. Supp. at 304; Reed v. 
Holliday, 19 F. 325, 326–27 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1884); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, at  
§ 13.05[B][1]. 
 54. See, e.g., Mathews Conveyer, 135 F.2d at 84–85 (adding a slight nuance to Folsom, the 
court recommended that accusations of piracy require the court to engage in a highly fact intensive 
inquiry); Loew’s, 131 F. Supp. at 176 (expanding the fair use doctrine, by introducing the idea that 
the purpose of the use was most important). 
 55. See, e.g., Loew’s, 131 F. Supp. at 175–78 (finding that “[c]riticism is an important and 
proper exercise of fair use” and expanding the fair use doctrine by introducing the idea that the 
purpose of the use was most important). 
 56. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, at § 13.05[B][1]. 
 57. See, e.g., Reed, 19 F. at 326–27 (granting preliminary injunction “without proof of actual 
damage”); Henry Holt, 23 F. Supp. at 304 (concluding that actual damage is not required for the 
issuance of an injunction). 
 58. See e.g. Mathews Conveyer, 135 F.2d at 85 (finding that the purpose of fair use was to 
promote progress by allowing subsequent users to build on the knowledge of others to benefit the 
greater good); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 41 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8138) (opining that 
an infringer must not capitalize on the labors of another); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (same). 
 59. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (limiting 
copyright coverage to books, maps, and charts). 
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1976, Congress added fair use as an affirmative defense to an action for 
copyright infringement.60 
The statute sets forth four factors that may be considered when a defendant 
raises a fair use defense, including: 
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.61 
Congress made these four factors non-exclusive to provide fair use a flexible 
definition62 and sought to codify the most prevalent factors expressed by 
judges.63  Fair use has been defended as one of the most fundamental aspects of 
copyright law because it advances the stated purpose of the law by championing 
the public’s interest in access to intellectual property and advances progress by 
allowing subsequent authors to build off the work of previous authors.64  
                                                 
 60. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  To prevail on a copyright infringement claim, plaintiff has 
the burden to prove that there is ownership of a valid copyright, and that the defendant copied 
component elements of the work that are original.  Id.; see H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5677 (stating that the doctrine of fair use is “one of the most 
important and well-established limitations on the exclusive right of copyright owners”); see also 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (“The Copyright 
Act represents the culmination of a major legislative reexamination of copyright doctrine.”). 
 61. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 62. H. REP. NO. 94-473, at 65 (stating that because circumstances in copyright cases can be 
so diverse, bright line rules are not as helpful as a case-by-case analysis); see also Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 476–77 (1984) (Blackmum, J., dissenting) 
(stating that no static rules for fair use have been established and so the factors are not exhaustive 
or to be strictly applied and the factors are not to be assigned “particular weight”). 
 63. H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (stating that the factors are not exclusive, but are the closest 
approximation to the concepts created by judges); see Leval, supra note 7, at 1110–11 (advancing 
the idea that the four factors were never meant to be weighed equally but instead should be viewed 
as a way to reach the objectives of copyright protection; however, judges have treated the statutory 
factors as conclusive, leading to failures to contemplate additional relevant considerations); David 
Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
263, 267, 280 (2003) (noting that the major issue with the four factors is that they are too flexible 
and can be manipulated to support both the conclusion that a use is fair and that the same use is not 
fair depending on the relative weight each judge assigns to the various factors); William C. Walker, 
Jr., Fair Use: The Adjustable Tool for Maintaining Copyright Equilibrium, 43 LA. L. REV. 735, 
740 (1983) (concluding that this flexibility makes the outcome of copyright cases less predictable 
and decisions less consistent).  But see H. REP. NO. 94-1478, at 65 (stating that because fair use is 
an equitable rule of reason, each case must be decided on an individual basis). 
 64. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (stating that copyright law serves an “important public purpose” 
and encourages “free flow of ideas”). 
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Furthermore, the fair use doctrine properly respects the rights of copyright 
holders by determining which uses are not fair.65 
Once infringement has been found, courts may issue an injunction to stop 
further violations.66  Upon a final order, courts may even order the offending 
works to be destroyed.67  The Copyright Act also includes varying remedies, 
such as actual damages that incorporate any of the infringers’ profits68 or 
statutory damages ranging in amounts of $750 to $30,000 for “any one work” at 
the complete discretion of the courts.69  These flexible remedies can result in 
significant or nominal amounts based on the court’s perception of the infringer’s 
actions.70 
D.  Supreme Court Decisions on Fair Use 
The Supreme Court has offered an in-depth fair use analysis.71  Though the 
Court has never dealt specifically with appropriation visual artists, these 
opinions have shaped lower court rulings involving appropriation artists.72  Over 
the course of deciding these cases, the Supreme Court significantly changed its 
stance on fair use when confronted with different facts.  The Court moved from 
                                                 
 65. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, at § 13.05[B][1]. 
 66. 17 U.S.C. § 502.  To prevail on a copyright infringement claim, plaintiff has the burden 
to prove that there is ownership for a valid copyright, and that the defendant copied component 
elements of the work that are original.  17 U.S.C. § 501(b). 
 67. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b); see Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992) (ordering the 
destruction of infringing documents); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 335–36 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013) (ordering the destruction of infringing photographs). 
 68. 17 U.S.C. §504(b).  The statute does not define the calculations needed to determine actual 
damage but instead offers that the damages must be “as a result of the infringement.”  Id.  The 
amount of the infringer’s profit is to be calculated by subtracting deductible expenses and profit 
not arising from use of the copyrighted material from the infringer’s gross profits.  Id. 
 69. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). 
 70. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).  When an infringer has acted “willfully,” the court may order fees 
in addition to the statutory damages not to exceed $150,000.  Id. 
 71. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994) (holding that the 
presence of one element of fair use is not enough to make a fair use determiniation); Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237–38 (1990) (stating fair use is more common in factual work than fictional 
work); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985) (“Publication 
of an author’s expression before he has authorized its dissemination seriously infringes the author’s 
right to decide when and whether it will be made public, a factor not present in fair use of published 
works.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433–34 (1984) 
(explaining fair use as a defense to infringement and remedies). 
 72. See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that the Campbell Court’s transformative use inquiry is paramount); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 
694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 
(2d Cir. 2006); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 306; Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, No. 12-CV-464, 2013 
WL 4197454, at *10 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 15, 2013); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. 
Supp. 370, 384–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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a fair use analysis that barred commercial use,73 to one that focused on the 
economic considerations of the fourth factor,74 and finally to a focus on 
transformative use.75  The variety of outcomes encompassed in the Court’s 
decisions continues to confuse lower courts’ fair-use evaluations.76 
1.  Commercial Use is Presumptively Unfair: The Betamax Case 
In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court 
dealt with then-new technology, known as a Betamax, that allowed purchasers 
to video record programs aired on television.77 Owners of copyrighted works 
aired on television challenged the ability of consumers to use the Betamax to 
create an exact copy of the works as a violation of the copyrights.78  They also 
challenged Sony’s ability to manufacture the product on a theory of vicarious 
copyright infringement and sought to enjoin production.79 
After applying copyright factors one and four as outlined in the Copyright 
Act, the Court held that the neither the use nor the manufacture of the Betamax 
was copyright infringement.80  The Court reasoned that consumers primarily 
used the Betamax to record television shows for later viewing—not for 
commercial purposes.81  The Court found that the commerciality aspect of first 
factor the most salient.82  The Court unequivocally stated that if the Betamax 
                                                 
 73. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 421. 
 74. See Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 566–67. 
 75. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 76. Compare Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting 
Sony’s conclusion on commercial use), with Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 760 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(applying Sony’s reasoning on commercial use), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 944 (2013).  See also 
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (agreeing with Campbell’s 
abandonment of commercial use being presumptively unfair and instead adopting Harper’s idea 
that commercial use was simply a separate factor to be considered); Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705–06 
(adopting Campbell’s transformative use analysis); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 
913, 921 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that Campbell’s ruling disagreed with Harper’s elevation of the 
fourth factor); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 311–12 (agreeing with Harper that the fourth factor is most 
important). 
 77. Sony, 464 U.S. at 422. 
 78. Id. at 420. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 449–55.  The court did not find it necessary to discuss any of the other factors 
identified by the Copyright Act, thereby underscoring the importance that economic factors should 
play in fair use analysis.  Id. 
 81. Id. at 425, 449 (finding Betamax enabled “noncommercial, nonprofit activity”).  
Additionally, the Betamax has several other uses, including the ability to watch videos and record 
non-copyrighted programs, such as “sports, religious, educational, and other programming.”  Id. at 
443–44.  The Court found that the copyrighted programs were initially distributed to viewers by 
broadcast for free, and that the recording of the programs was a private activity, all of which 
weighed in favor of finding the use fair.  Id. at 424, 449. 
 82. Id. at 451–52 (finding that non-commercial use required further analysis, the Court needed 
to decide whether the “particular use [was] harmful” and determine the effects of widespread use 
on the potential market for the copyrighted programs). 
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was used for commercial purposes, that use would have been presumptively 
unfair.83  However, Justice Blackmun dissented and opined that outright copying 
of copyrighted material was not a productive use, and therefore fair use was not 
applicable.84 
2.  Unpublished Memoirs Are Not Fair Use 
In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court 
extended Sony’s focus on the importance of the commercial use distinction.85  In 
Harper, the Nation, a news magazine, published unauthorized excerpts of an 
unpublished memoir of President Gerald Ford.86  Harper purchased exclusive 
rights to the manuscript and then sold first rights to publish excerpts to Time 
Magazine.87 
The Court held that the Nation’s use of excerpts was not fair, reasoning that 
Nation published the excerpts for commercial purposes, which affected the 
market for copyright holders based on Harper’s ability to offer the first right to 
publish.88  The Court elevated its commerciality analysis by treating it as a 
“separate factor,” that when found should weigh heavily against a finding of fair 
use.89  Most importantly, the Court identified the last factor, the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work, as “undoubtedly 
the single most important element of fair use.”90  To further the copyright law 
goal of protecting “the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas,” the 
Court sought to ensure that the new work did not “supplant” the original.91 
                                                 
 83. Other courts have also followed this approach.  See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (“The fact that a publication was commercial as 
opposed to nonprofit . . . tends to weight against a finding of fair use.”); Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 
F.3d 747, 760 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Sony’s presumption), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 944 (2013).  
But see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (warning against applying 
the “hard presumptive significance” as a “per se rule” in copyright cases presenting issues of 
commercial use); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(advocating a more sophisticated approach than Sony’s by making a distinction between “direct 
commercial use” and “indirect relation to commercial activity”); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 
803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that fair use would never be found when commercial 
use is designated as presumptively unfair). 
 84. Sony, 464 U.S. at 478 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (defining productive use as a use that 
“result[s] in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first author’s work” and 
concluding that direct copying of television programs was not productive use). 
 85. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 562. 
 86. Id. at 542. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 568–69. 
 89. Id. at 562.  Commerciality in the context of Harper was not solely concerned with the 
second user’s motivation but instead with whether the second user “stands to profit from the 
exploitation of the copyrighted material.”  Id. 
 90. Id. at 566–67 (stating that a plaintiff in a copyright action only needs to establish that the 
use of the copyrighted work was connected with reasonable probability to the loss of revenue by 
the original author). 
 91. Id. at 558, 562. 
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3.  Turning Point: Converting Rock to Rap is Transformative Fair Use 
The Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. greatly departed 
from its earlier emphasis on the commerciality aspect of the first factor and the 
economic loss factor.92  The case arose when the rap group, 2 Live Crew 
composed a parody song of Roy Orbison’s rock song, “Oh, Pretty Woman” 
without obtaining permission.93  The group used the musical score from the 
original song, but added additional beats and completely changed the lyrics.94  
The Campbell Court used the standard copyright analysis, stating that each case 
of copyright infringement required a fact-intensive case-by-case analysis, and 
that each factor must be “weighed together, in light of the purposes of 
copyright.”95  The Court held that the use was fair because the group successfully 
transformed the original song into a new expression.96 
Building on the Folsom notion of superseding the original and Harper’s 
mandate that the new work must not “supplant” the original, Campbell added a 
new dimension to the first factor analysis by requiring a finding of 
transformative use.97  Now a fair use inquiry must determine whether the new 
work “instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’”98  In fact, 
the creation of transformative works furthers the purpose of copyright law.99 
                                                 
 92. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 589. 
 95. Id. at 577–78 (stating that the purpose of copyright law is to uphold the Constitutional 
mandate to promote the arts and sciences). 
 96. Id. at 579. 
 97. See id. at 579; see also Harper, 471 U.S. at 562; Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 98. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.  The idea of transformative use was first expounded in Judge 
Leval’s journal article in which he suggested that the goal of first fair use factor was to determine 
whether the use conformed with the main objective of copyright protection.  See Leval, supra note 
7, at 1111–12.  The main objective of copyright protection was to stimulate creativity for the greater 
benefit of the people.  Id.  Therefore, a justified use of copyrighted material is one that is productive 
and transforms the original purpose and manner of expression of the copyrighted material.  Id.  
Leval has consistently been cited by courts for his opinion on the importance of transformative use 
for fair use inquiries.  See, e.g., Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932, 939 (4th 
Cir. 2013); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705–06 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250–53 (2d Cir. 2006); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478 
(2d Cir. 2004); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141–42 (2d Cir. 
1998); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 112–13 (2d Cir. 1998); Ringgold v. 
Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78–79 (2d Cir. 1997); Am. Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 99. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Leval, supra note 7, at 1107, 1111–12 (arguing that 
transformative use is found when a use is productive and uses the original material for a different 
purpose and in a different manner, which allows the newly created work to benefit “the intellectual 
enrichment of the public”). 
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Particularly salient to the Campbell analysis is whether the new work is a parody 
of the original.100 
Notably, the Campbell Court did not view transformative use as the only 
means by which fair use could be found.101  The finding of transformative use, 
however, could outweigh other factors such as commercial use.102  Furthermore, 
Campbell directly contradicted the principle expressed in Sony when it stated 
that Congress could not have intended to make commercial use presumptively 
unfair.103 
The influence of these three Supreme Court opinions cannot be overstated.104  
There has been great variety in how lower courts have applied the fair use 
principles outlined by the Court.105  Most recently, courts, especially when 
dealing with visual artists, have prioritized the determination of transformative 
use as pronounced in Campbell.106  This elevation of the first factor and the belief 
that the fourth factor is critical has reduced the importance of the second and 
                                                 
 100. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (finding that the rap song was a parody and therefore could 
be a fair use).  Other scholars and courts have found that the parody analysis is an important factor 
in a copyright infringement determination. See Marlin H. Smith, Note, The Limits of Copyright: 
Property, Parody, and the Public Domain, 42 DUKE L.J. 1233, 1247–48 (1993) (discussing the role 
of parody in fair use determinations); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255 (finding that in order for 
appropriation art to qualify as a parody, the intent of the artist must be to comment on the 
copyrighted material); 
 101. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.  Judge Leval was careful to qualify the importance of 
transformative use.  See Leval, supra note 7, at 1111–12.  Judge Leval concluded that an “extensive 
taking” could prohibit “creative incentives” and thereby exceed the bounds of productive use 
justification.  Id. at 1112.  When “the takings are excessive” and other factors weigh in favor of the 
copyright owner, transformative use should not override those findings.  Id. 
 102. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.  Other courts have agreed with the Campbell Court in that 
regard.  See, e.g., Seltzer v. Greenday, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding 
that transformative use outweighs a finding of parody); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 
353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that transformative use and parody outweigh a finding 
of commercial use); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir.1998) 
(holding that a finding of parody outweighs a commercial use finding). 
 103. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. 
 104. See generally Michael D. Murray, What Is Transformative? An Explanatory Synthesis of 
the Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair Use Law, 11  
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260 (2012) (giving an overview of Supreme Court case law on 
copyright infringement and explaining the significance of each case). 
 105. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (documenting how lower courts look to the 
Supreme Court decisions on fair use and rule in a way that solves the case most efficiently). 
 106. See, e.g., Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d at 1175–76 (finding that a transformative use inquiry 
can be highly contentious); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707–08 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 618 (2013); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006); Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, No.  
12-CV-464, 2013 WL 4197454, at *4–5 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 15, 2013); see also Murray, supra note 
102, at 262 (arguing that the question of transformative use has transformed copyright law). 
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third factors in cases presenting issues of transformation, parody, and general 
repurposing of copyrighted works.107 
E.  Moving Towards Transformative Use: Fair Use Applied to Appropriation 
Artists 
Campbell’s influence becomes most evident when juxtaposing the 
appropriation art cases decided prior to and following Campbell.108  Three cases 
have dealt with appropriation artists  extensively: Rogers v. Koons,109 Blanch v. 
Koons,110 and Cariou v. Prince.111  These cases highlight the importance of 
Campbell’s characterization of transformative use as the paramount 
consideration in the fair use analysis.  This move to prioritizing transformative 
use has both helped and harmed artists.  When courts judge the aesthetic value 
of the allegedly infringing works and see transformative use, appropriation 
artists have been able to claim legal victories.112  However, when other judges 
fail to see transformation, appropriation artists have been barred from fair use.113 
1.  The Pre-Campbell Appropriation Case: Rogers v. Koons 
The well-known appropriation artist, Jeff Koons, was held liable for copyright 
infringement after using a copyrighted photograph for the basis of his sculptural 
work.114  His fair use defense, based on the characterization of his work as 
parody,115 failed to sway the Second Circuit.116  Koons created a sculpture of a 
man and woman sitting on a park bench.117  Between the two figures was a 
“string of puppies” created to emulate an image of puppies Koons discovered on 
                                                 
 107. Darren Hudson Hick, Appropriation and Transformation, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1155 (2013) (arguing that this assumption has led courts to consider the first 
fact and upon a finding of commercial use disregard the other factors culminating in the finding 
that use was not fair); see also Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d at 1179 (stating that factors one and four 
have always been the most important); Adrianne Barbour, Note, Yes, Rasta 2.0: Cariou v. Prince 
and the Fair Use Test of Transformative Use in Appropriation Art Cases, 14 TUL. J. TECH.  
& INTELL. PROP. 365, 370–71 (2011); Liz McKenzie, Drawing Lines: Addressing Cognitive Bias 
in Art Appropriation Cases, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83, 91 (2013). 
 108. Compare Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698–99 and Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 
1992), with Blanch, 467 F.3d at 259. 
 109. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305. 
 110. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 259. 
 111. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698–99. 
 112. See, e.g., Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d at 1181; Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712; Kienitz v. Sconnie 
Nation LLC, No. 12-CV-464, 2013 WL 4197454, at *10 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 15, 2013). 
 113. See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) rev’d in part, vacated 
in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
 114. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 306. 
 115. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (describing court rulings on parody and fair 
use). 
 116. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309–10. 
 117. Id. at 303; see also Greenberg, supra note 13, at 25–26. 
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a postcard.118  The photographer of the picture on the postcard sued Koons after 
reading a newspaper article advertising Koons’s exhibition of the sculpture.119 
The Second Circuit began by analyzing the first fair use factor.120  The court 
examined whether the sculpture was used for commercial or non-profit purposes 
because under the Sony and Harper decisions, a finding of commercial use 
weighed against a finding of fair use.121  The court found that Koons profited 
from the sale and exhibit of the work.122  Furthermore, the court found that 
Koons acted in bad faith by removing the notice of copyright from the postcard, 
and therefore copied the content in an “intentionally exploitive” manner.123 
Next, the court analyzed the first factor, turning to the issue of parody.124  The 
Copyright Act provides that use of copyrighted work for parody or satire is fair 
use because parody operates as a form of criticism that requires viewers’ ability 
to recognize the material being caricatured.125  Koons argued that his sculpture 
was simply a parody of society in general and not of the copyrighted 
photograph.126  Koons further argued that as an appropriation artist, media and 
mass-produced images “caused a deterioration in the quality of society.”127  By 
re-contextualizing these images in his artwork, Koons believed that he was 
commenting critically on the effect of these images on society.128  While 
agreeing with Koons that his parody commented on society at large, the court 
held that parody as a fair use defense must comment on the original work itself, 
not merely offer a statement on society.129 
                                                 
 118. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304.  Koons removed the copyright accompanying the postcard, sent 
it to his sculpture artists with the directions that the “work must be just like photo.”  Id. at 305. 
 119. Id.  In addition to advertising and exhibiting his work, Koons sold four copies of the statue.  
Id. 
 120. Id. at 308–09. 
 121. Id.; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985); 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1984). 
 122. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309; see also Greenberg, supra note 13, at 30–31 (noting the 
paradoxical nature of Rogers’s work being a “mass produced” and “commercially exploited” 
postcard compared with Koons’ss “limited-edition” work). 
 123. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309. 
 124. Id.  Traditionally, this is a question for the court.  See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain 
Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (clarifying that whether a work is a parody is a question 
of law requiring a determination by a court). 
 125. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  Parody is one of the express allowances mentioned in the 
Copyright Act.  Id.  In Rogers, the court defined parody as: “when one artist, for comic effect or 
social commentary, closely imitates the style of another artist and in so doing creates a new art 
work that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the original.”  Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309–10. 
 126. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  This is a common belief among appropriation artists.  See Marvin Heiferman  
& Richard Prince, When Jokes Become Second Nature, BOMB, Summer 1988, at 35, 36. 
 129. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. 
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The court devoted very little discussion to the second and third factors.130  On 
the second factor, the court found that the puppies photograph was an original 
work of art and that its photographer made a living from his photography.131  
Therefore, the nature of the copyrighted work weighed against a finding of fair 
use.132  Similarly, the third factor also weighed against a finding of fair use 
because the photograph was copied in toto.133 
In judging the fourth factor, the court looked again at the commercial nature 
of Koons’s artwork.134  The copyright owner, Rogers, only needed to prove that 
widespread dissemination of Koons’s sculpture—the sculpture itself or 
photographs of the sculpture—would prejudice the potential market for Rogers’s 
work or subsequent derivative works from the photograph.135  The court 
hypothesized that if another artist wanted to purchase the rights to Rogers’s 
work, the existence of Koons’s work could negatively affect that transaction.136  
The possibility of harm alone weighed against a finding of fair use.137 
2.  The Post-Campbell Appropriation Case: Blanch v. Koons 
More than a decade after Rogers, Koons was again sued by a photographer 
for copyright infringement, but this time he was able to use the intervening 
Campbell decision to his advantage.138  Koons contended that his painting 
collages were transformative enough to qualify as fair use.139  In a series of 
paintings commissioned by Deutsche Bank, Koons incorporated images from 
fashion magazines.140  These borrowed images included a photograph of 
women’s legs taken by the fashion photographer Andrea Blanch.141 
The court considered the first factor “the heart” of the fair use inquiry, and 
devoted the majority of its analysis to this transformative use inquiry.142  Koons 
argued that his purposes for using the fashion photograph were different from 
                                                 
 130. Id. at 310–11. 
 131. Id. at 310. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 311. 
 134. Id. at 311–12. 
 135. Id. at 312. 
 136. Id.; see INDE, supra note 17, at 4–17 (1998) (summarizing the background of the case and 
describing the origin of each of the pieces of “art” at issue in Rogers). 
 137. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 312 (noting that the court presumes harm “where the use is intended 
for commercial gain”). 
 138. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250–59 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Campbell v.  
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 139. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252. 
 140. Id. at 247. 
 141. Id.  Koons was paid two million dollars for this series, while Blanch, who owned the 
copyright for the photograph, was paid $750 by the fashion magazine, Allure.  Id. at 248–49. 
 142. Id. at 251–53. 
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those motivating Blanch’s creation of the photograph.143  Agreeing with Koons, 
the court found that the difference in both artists’ descriptions of their work 
justified a finding of transformative use.144 
Although disputed by the court, the finding of transformative use practically 
made the inquiry into the other factors less relevant.145  The court found that 
even though Koons’s use of the photograph was commercial, the finding of 
transformative use made this finding less significant.146  Similarly, the second 
factor was found to have “limited weight” because Koons’s use reached the 
appropriate level of transformation.147 
The court analyzed the third factor by looking at the elements included in the 
original photograph and the elements that appeared in Koons’ss collage.148  The 
court distilled the original photograph down to its basic elements, finding that 
Koons only used three out of five of the identified elements of the original 
photograph.149  Moreover, Koons’ss use was also reasonable because the court 
deemed his work a parody of Blanch’s work.150  Therefore, out of necessity, 
Koons made use of the original photograph to evoke the idea of mass media 
advertisements.151 
Finally, the court turned to the last factor, which also weighed in Koons’ss 
favor.152  The court emphasized that Blanch had not sought to publish or license 
the photograph, that there was no evidence of Koons’ss use harming the market 
for Blanch’s work, and that Koons’ss actions did not decrease the value of the 
original photograph.153 
                                                 
 143. Id. at 248, 252–53.  Koons’ss goal here, as in Rogers, was to comment on society and to 
remind viewers of his or her relationship to advertisement and how mass media affects lives.  
Compare id. (explaining how Koons claimed he wanted viewers to experience his work relative to 
their own personal experiences), with Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(explaining that here Koons argued his work was a societal parody).  Conversely, Blanch’s stated 
purpose was to evoke a sense of sexuality.  Blanch, 467 F.3d at 248. 
 144. Id. at 253, 259. 
 145. Id. at 254.  Other courts have also followed this approach.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (stating that in the context of a challenge to an allegedly 
infringing rap song the commercial use of a work should be ignored after the finding of 
transformative use); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that 
transformative use makes the commercial use inquiry less significant). 
 146. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 254. 
 147. Id. at 257. 
 148. Id. at 257–58. 
 149. Id.  The basic elements of Blanch’s photograph included a model’s legs, feet, and sandals, 
the placement of the model’s feet on the lap of a male model, and the background elements that 
pointed to the photography having been shot in an airplane.  Id.  The Koons collage used only the 
legs, feet, and sandals found in Blanch’s photograph.  Id. at 258. 
 150. Id. at 255. 
 151. Id.  But see Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a parody 
must specifically comment on the copyrighted work). 
 152. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 259. 
 153. Id. at 249, 258. 
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3.  Cariou v. Prince: Illustrating that Transformation is Not Easily Identified 
Patrick Cariou is a professional photographer who documented the lives of 
Jamaican Rastafarians by creating landscape and portrait photographs.154  In 
2000, his photographs were compiled in a photographic essay entitled Yes, 
Rasta.155  After purchasing the pictorial book, Richard Prince created a series of 
paintings and collages incorporating Cariou’s photographs.156  Prince’s series 
was exhibited in Saint Barthelemy and in the Gagosian Gallery in New York.157  
Prince is a well-known appropriation artist who had gained a reputation as being 
an art rebel for his liberal use of copyrighted images.158  By contrast, Cariou is 
a small-time photographer who specialized in classical black and white 
photography.159 
Prince’s collage paintings incorporated Cariou’s photographs in various 
ways.160  Some works used small portions of Cariou’s photographs, distorting 
the images to the point that they were unrecognizable, thereby completely 
obscuring Cariou’s work.161  Other collages used entire photographs to which 
Prince added colorful “lozenges” to the eyes of Cariou’s subjects and made other 
figures look as though they were playing musical instruments.162  Cariou learned 
of Prince’s use of his work after a gallery owner declined to exhibit Cariou’s 
photographs because of the owner’s belief that the photographs had already been 
exhibited in collaboration with Prince.163 
On April 25, 2013, the Second Circuit held that Prince’s paintings and 
collages were transformative as a matter of law, and therefore, did not violate 
Cariou’s copyright.164  The court built upon the rulings in Campbell and Blanch 
when it again found that transformative use outweighs all of the other fair use 
factors.165  This ruling effectively overturned the district court, which had found 
that there was minimal, if any, transformation.166 
                                                 
 154. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
 155. Id. at 698–99 (noting that the book was not meant to be “pop art”). 
 156. Id. at 698. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Paul Taylor, Richard Prince, Art’s Bad Boy, Becomes (Partly) Respectable, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 17, 1992, at H31; Gilbert, supra note 14. 
 159. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699 (discussing the limited commercial success of Cariou’s black 
and white photographic book). 
 160. Id. at 706. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 699. 
 163. Id. at 704. 
 164. Id. at 695, 707, 712. 
 165. Id. at 708–10. 
 166. Id. at 712. 
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a.  District Court Found Minimal Transformation 
Focusing almost entirely on the transformative use element of the first factor, 
the district court ruled that Prince’s work was not consistently transformative.167  
The court looked first to the intent of the artist, finding that Prince’s intent was 
not to comment on Cariou’s photographs but instead mirrored Cariou’s intent, 
and therefore the works were not transformative.168  This analysis added a new 
dimension to transformative use by requiring that a subsequent work comment 
on the original.169  Next, the court turned to the aesthetic aspects of 
transformative use.170  By comparing the aesthetic attributes of each painting, 
the court reached the conclusion that the majority of Prince’s paintings were 
heavily copied and in some cases incorporated unaltered photographs.171  Even 
though several paintings did not borrow heavily from Cariou, the district court 
looked at Prince’s work in the aggregate, holding that the overall transformation 
was “minimal at best,” precluding a finding of fair use.172 
b.  The Second Circuit Easily Identifies Transformation 
The Second Circuit also focused on the first fair use factor in determining 
whether Prince’s collages were transformative.173  Focusing on the art’s 
appearance, the court found that Prince’s work was larger in scale, incorporated 
color, featured distorted human body parts, and, in essence, had a completely 
different meaning and feeling than Cariou’s photographs.174  The court 
interpreted Prince’s work as being “crude and jarring,” exuding a “hectic and 
provocative” feeling.175  In contrast, Cariou’s photographs were characterized as 
being “serene and deliberate.”176  Confusingly, the court held that this analysis 
only applied to twenty-five of the thirty paintings created by Prince.177  The 
remaining five works were eventually remanded to the district court for its fact-
finding on the transformative use question.178  The court then moved to the 
second inquiry within the first factor of the fair use inquiry, simultaneously 
                                                 
 167. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 347–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, vacated in 
part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
 168. Id. at 349 (reasoning that the intent of both artists was to “communicate to the viewer core 
truths about Rastafarians”). 
 169. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698 (criticizing the district court for adding another element to 
the transformative use inquiry). 
 170. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349.  The Ninth Circuit took a similar approach.  See Seltzer 
v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (conducting a transformative use inquiry 
by looking at the physical changes made to an original work). 
 171. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349–50. 
 172. Id. at 350. 
 173. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705–06. 
 174. Id. at 706. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 711. 
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assessing “the purpose and character of the use” and “whether the allegedly 
infringing work has a commercial or nonprofit educational purpose.”179  Finding 
that Prince’s use was clearly commercial, the court disregarded this finding as 
relatively unimportant because the new works were so transformative.180 
The court next discussed the fourth factor: the effect of Prince’s paintings on 
the potential market for Cariou’s pictorial book and photographs.181  In 
considering this factor, the court focused on whether Prince’s works would usurp 
Cariou’s market for works derivative of his photographs.182  Focusing on the 
aesthetic differences of the two works, the court believed that there was no 
evidence that Cariou would license his photography for other artists like 
Prince.183  Furthermore, the court viewed the inability of Cariou to exhibit his 
artwork as a simple misunderstanding that was not a result of Prince’s use of the 
copyrighted material.184  The court also considered Cariou’s earnings from the 
sale of his book, which totaled $8,000, and his reluctance to sell prints of his 
work to anyone other than four close acquaintances.185  Unlike Cariou, Prince’s 
art openings attracted “wealthy and famous” entertainers, musicians, actors, 
professional athletes, and business moguls.186  Based on these facts and the 
aesthetic differences, the court determined that the audiences for Cariou’s work 
and Prince’s work were completely different.187  As such, Prince’s work could 
not then usurp the market for Cariou’s work.188 
Briefly discussing the remaining factors, the court easily dismissed the 
worthiness of protecting Cariou’s photographs.189 Cariou’s photographs were 
creative works that the Copyright Act was meant to protect.190  However, the 
finding of transformation outweighed this concern.191  The court could not come 
to a consensus on the third factor regarding the amount and substantiality of the 
use.192  The court stated that the twenty-five transformative paintings used a 
                                                 
 179. Id. at 708. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 709. 
 184. Id.  The court believed that the gallery owner did not understand the nature of Prince’s 
use of Cariou’s photos and mistakenly believed Cariou and Prince were working together.  Id.  This 
mistaken belief led the gallery owner to decline to show Cariou’s work, not the fact that Prince had 
used Cariou’s copyrighted works.  Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.; see also Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 
1998) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (explaining that when 
transformative use is identified, it is likely that the market for the original will be usurped)). 
 189. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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reasonable amount of Cariou’s photographs.193  The decision regarding the five 
paintings that the court could not deem sufficiently transformative to reach a fair 
use determination was remanded for the district court’s determination on the 
amount of the copyrighted work used.194  The remanded case settled out of 
court.195 
II.  LOOKING FOR TRANSFORMATIVE USE SHIFTS THE COURTS’ FOCUS TO THE 
AESTHETIC VALUE OF ART RESULTING IN THE ABANDONMENT OF THE 
TRADITIONAL VALUES UNDERLYING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
A.  Prioritizing Transformative Value Leads to Inconsistent Rulings 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, courts are now turning to a 
presumption of fair use after finding that a work has successfully transformed 
the meaning and purpose of the copyrighted work.196  But in the absence of 
objective, uniform criteria, the question becomes: how do courts determine 
which works are transformative and which are not?  Courts continue to employ 
different methods to answer this question, leading to increasingly subjective 
determinations and disparate results.197  These determinations are based on: 
judges’ visual perceptions of the art, beliefs about the genre of appropriation art 
and its artists, and the notion that a reasonable observer (in most cases, the judges 
themselves)198 can know transformation when they see it.199   
1.  Transformative Use as Viewed Through the Artist’s Meaning and Genre 
Courts determine the purpose and meaning of a copyrighted work by looking 
to the artists’ own statements about their goals in using the works and comparing 
those statements to the copyright holders’ testimony about the intent of their 
works.200 Both the district court and appeals court in Blanch and the district court 
in Cariou v. Prince looked directly to the artists’ statements about the meaning 
                                                 
 193. Id. at 706. 
 194. Id. at 711. 
 195. Randy Kennedy, Richard Prince Settles Suit Over Photos, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2014, at 
C3. 
 196. See supra Part I.E. 
 197. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 198. See infra Part II.B.  The vast majority of fair use cases are decided through motions for 
summary judgment.  See also Cariou, 714 F.3d 694; Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 
301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 199. See generally Farley, supra note 2, at 857 (arguing that judges need to employ  
peer-reviewed aesthetic theory to narrow the gap between artistic discourse and legal determination 
regarding the same). 
 200. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252. 
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of their work.201  In Blanch, the artist, Koons, claimed to have a completely 
different intent, one of social commentary, than the one exhibited by the 
copyrighted work of the fashion photographer, Blanch, whose stated intent was 
to create a sexualized advertisement.202  Relying heavily on artists’ expressed 
construction of their work is highly problematic because it could lead to 
defendants unreliably claiming transformative intent when there was none.203  
Paradoxically, in the case of artists like Prince, who routinely claim that their 
work has no artistic meaning, the court has found that lack of expressed intent is 
evidence of a lack of transformative use.204  Neither approach results in accuracy 
because both depend on the ability of the artist to lucidly and truthfully express 
the meaning of his artwork without regard to the actual meanings of the work, 
which can vary with context and according to the experience of the observers.205 
2.  Appropriation Art on Trial 
The status of the artist is complicated further when courts harbor biases about 
who the artist is and their membership in the appropriation art genre.  The term 
“appropriation artist” itself has been called “unfortunate[] in a legal context.”206 
Appropriation is defined as “[t]he exercise of control over property; a taking of 
possession.”207  Infringement is similarly defined as “[a]n act that interferes with 
one of the exclusive rights of a patent, copyright, or trademark owner.”208  The 
art community has proposed other equally problematic imagery, such as 
comparing appropriation artists to thieves.209 
Courts have shown bias against appropriation artists by characterizing them 
as thieves and pirates who sail under “the flag of piracy.”210  As a result, the 
artists are sometimes viewed as illegitimate artists and their works are not 
respected as art.211  Cases involving appropriation art routinely result in 
                                                 
 201. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252–53, 257; Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013). 
 202. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252–53. 
 203. Kennedy, supra note 31 (claiming that the question of transformative use “turns on artistic 
intent, often a much grayer area in the visual arts than in other arts”). 
 204. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
 205. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (“If an infringement of 
copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use solely on the basis of the infringer’s claim to 
a higher or different artistic use . . . there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense.”). 
 206. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 246. 
 207. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (9th ed. 2009). 
 208. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 851 (9th ed. 2009). 
 209. Grace-Yvett Gemmell, Appropriation Art (Or How to Steal Like an Artist), ARTSPACE 
(Nov. 28, 2012), available at http://www.artspace.com/magazine/art_101/art_101_appropriation 
_art. 
 210. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 311; see also Farley, supra note 2, at 834 (suggesting that the court 
implied that appropriation art is more akin to theft than true art). 
 211. See PATRY, supra note 8, at § 1:2 (arguing that defining fair use as a limitation of 
copyright goes along with the belief that “copyright owners are good” and infringers are “bad”). 
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injunctions and orders for the destruction of the offending artwork.212  At least 
one scholar has argued that no judge would order the destruction of an artist’s 
work that was viewed as legitimate.213  Generally, appropriation artists intend to 
take the work of others and some even describe their creative process as 
stealing.214  This leads many courts to negatively view appropriation artists on 
the whole.215  To combat these issues some scholars argue that judges should 
consider aspects of art history and the context in which the art was created.216  
However, those considerations are not a good indicator of transformative use 
because appropriation artists always use copyrighted materials with the intent to 
re-contextualize the images.217 
3.  Does the Reasonable Observer Truly Know What Transformation Looks 
Like When They See It? 
The Campbell Court decided its parody case based partly on the differences 
that could “reasonably be perceived” when listening to and viewing the lyrics of 
the new rap song and the original rock song.218  This idea was further extended 
by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Koons, in which the court references the 
“average lay observer as a measure of whether the work is a parody.”219  
Applying this reasonable perception test to cases involving appropriation visual 
artists is problematic because of the subjective nature of visual arts.220  
Evidencing this difficulty, the Second Circuit and the district court in Cariou 
viewed the same work by Prince and developed two different theories on 
whether there was transformation use.221 
                                                 
 212. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 355–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, 
vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013); Rogers, 960 F.2d 
at 313. 
 213. Farley, supra note 2, at 834. 
 214. See Gemmell, supra note 209. 
 215. See, e.g., Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310–12 (preventing the defendant appropriation artist from 
asserting a fair use defense and finding that the copying was done in bad faith and motivated by 
profit). 
 216. See Elizabeth Winkowski, Comment, A Context-Sensitive Inquiry: The Interpretation of 
Meaning in Cases of Visual Appropriation Art, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 746,  
763–64 (2013); Farley, supra note 2, at 839. 
 217. See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310 (finding that the boundaries of fair use require that courts not 
simply allow all uses by appropriation artists based on the artists’ intentions); Roxana Badin, 
Comment, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transformative Value: Appropriation Art’s Exclusion from 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1653, 1660 (1995) (distinguishing 
appropriation from plagarism). 
 218. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582–83 (1994). 
 219. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308. 
 220. See Farley, supra note 2, at 811–19; Laura A. Heymann, Everything is Transformative: 
Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 450, 453–66 (2008). 
 221. See supra Part I.E.3; see also Randy Kennedy, Court Rules in Artist’s Favor, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 26, 2013, at C25, C32 (indicating that copyright lawyers saw the appeals court decision in 
Cariou as one that “further mudd[ied] an already confusing terrain for determining fair use”). 
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The court of appeals in Cariou used the reasonable observer approach by 
performing a side-by-side comparison of the works in question.222  From this 
comparison, the court determined that Cariou’s aesthetic was traditional, calm, 
and serene while Prince’s images were provocative, rough, and rudimentary.223  
In contrast, the district court found that there were minimal, if any, 
transformative elements in the majority of Prince’s collages.224  In fact, the 
district court chose to view the amount of copying, and looked to see the amount 
of Cariou’s work that was visible to the viewer.225  The court of appeals in 
Cariou considered the elements of Prince’s work that differed from Cariou’s 
photographs, including Prince’s addition of color, his use of larger scaled 
images, and the change of medium from black and white photography to color 
painting collages.226 
These differences in the perception of visual art lead to the conclusion that the 
reasonable observer test is not an objective test at all.  Indeed, the majority of 
fair use cases are decided on motions for summary judgment, which gives judges 
open season on an intensely fact-bound, subjective inquiry open to many 
interpretations.227  Consequentially, judges, as opposed to juries, have become 
the sole authority of what can be reasonably perceived in each work.228  What is 
described as an objective test is then transformed into a subjective test based on 
the visual experience of a single individual.229 
B.  Deemphasizing Aesthetics Brings Fair Use Analysis in Line with the Goals 
of Copyright Law 
Limiting discussions of copyright infringement solely to aesthetics is 
problematic because it leads to inconsistent rulings based on each judge’s 
subjective experience with the art in question.230  Even art philosophers disagree 
                                                 
 222. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
 223. Id. at 706. 
 224. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, vacated in 
part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013); Jennifer Gilbert-Eggleston, 
Cariou v. Prince: Painter or Prince of Thieves?, 2011 DEN. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 117, 124–25 
(2011). 
 225. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349–50. 
 226. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706; see Greenberg, supra note 13, at 15 (discerning that courts 
consistently mistake changes in size as being transformative); Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The 
Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 231 (2007) 
(arguing that judges have very little art knowledge, which further complicates their ability to judge 
copyright cases involving art). 
 227. See Snow, supra note 19 at 485–87 (2010). 
 228. Id. at 485. 
 229. Arjun Gupta, “I’ll Be Your Mirror”-Contemporary Art and the Role of Style in 
Infringement Analysis, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 45, 61, 67 (2005) (noting judges’ preference for the 
subjective elements of art in infringement determinations). 
 230. See supra Part II.A; see also Farley, supra note 2, at 857 (stating that courts “adopt 
aesthetic theory intuitively”). 
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about how to determine meaning in art.231  When judges prioritize 
transformation, they are making aesthetic judgments.232  Courts are deciding 
how the art looks to the reasonable observer, taking into account changes in 
medium, color, and size, and reaching different opinions on the same art.233  
Moreover, courts have historically been reticent to judge the aesthetic value of 
art.234 
Enforcing the purpose of copyright law to both grant exclusive rights to 
copyright holders and preserve the public’s access to intellectual property is 
frustrated by courts’ inability to uniformly decide cases involving visual 
artists.235 Focusing too heavily on the aesthetic aspects of the works clouds the 
importance of the economic factors of fair use, including commerciality and the 
effect on the market.  These economic considerations were once the “heart” of 
fair use analysis236 and are particularly useful given the subjective nature of 
visual art.237 
III.  FOCUSING SOLELY ON ECONOMIC FACTORS WILL LEAD TO MORE 
CONSISTENT RULINGS 
A.  Economic Analysis Offers Coherent Fair Use Guidance 
Unlike aesthetic reasoning, economic analysis of fair use offers a more 
objective approach, and guarantees more uniform results.238  Economic inquiry 
can incorporate aspects of the current fair use analysis and expand that analysis 
                                                 
 231. Farley, supra note 2, at 841–46 (noting the several schools of thought concerning the 
proper way to interpret art).  Formalists believe that the expression of art is found in the “line, 
shape, color and other formal properties.”  Id. at 842.  As their name suggests, Intentionalists view 
the artist intentions as holding the key to art interpretation, while relativists believe that art is 
undefinable.  Id. at 842–43; see also Carlin, supra note 5, at 120 (observing that “a basic tenet of 
twentieth century art and philosophy is that virtually all concrete expression is in fact a copy of a 
copy”). 
 232. See Farley, supra note 2, at 849 (asserting that “judges rely almost exclusively on their 
intuition to guide their analysis on aesthetic questions”).  However, Farley argues that a judge’s 
aesthetic analysis can be a welcome aspect of art legal opinions as long as courts are explicit about 
resorting to aesthetic reasoning and fully explain how they reach decisions. Id. at 849–50. 
 233. Supra Part II.A.3. 
 234. Supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Leval, supra note 7, at 1107 (characterizing fair use analysis employed by judges as 
“mysterious” and “disorderly”).  Leval argues that fair use decisions are constantly overturned 
because judges have failed to find a consistent definition of fair use. This tendency creates 
confusion for legal scholars, lawyers, writers and copyright holders because each judges’ opinion 
are so unpredictable.  Id.  Furthermore, because fair use is an equitable principle it should always 
be employed rationally to fulfill the purpose of copyright law.  Id. 
 236. See supra Part I.B. 
 237. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 238. See Landes, supra note 4, at 17.  But see Farley, supra note 2, at 857–58 (arguing that it 
is better for judges to be honest about using aesthetic analysis than to ignore the issue completely 
or hide the true motivations for their rulings). 
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for greater effect.239  Economic analysis can be used to determine the optimal 
degree of copyright protection.240 
1.  Economic Considerations Spurred Copyright Protection 
The origins of copyright law can be traced to the economic principles that 
recognized that the cost of creating unique works was high, and that the profits 
from such innovation should be protected.241  Similarly, when individuals seek 
to copy another’s work, the infringer’s cost of copying is generally lower than 
the cost incurred by the innovator.242  This finding spurred the need for legal 
protection from infringement to incentivize the creation of original works.243  At 
the same time, copyright law allows entities other than the copyright holder to 
reasonably use copyrighted work for similar economic reasons.244  These 
reasonable or fair use allowances are linked to the theory that no innovation is 
made in a vacuum.245  Subsequent inventors always build on the collective 
knowledge of previous originators; allowing fair or reasonable uses results in 
lower costs to subsequent inventors and therefore encourages higher rates of 
                                                 
 239. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural And Economic Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982); William M. 
Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic 
Approach, 21 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 79, 81 (1992).  But see Greenberg, supra note 13, at 24 
(concluding that fair use is “a necessary safe harbor for the appropriation” and that exclusive 
property rights stifle creativity). 
 240. See Carlin, supra note 5, at 104; William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 325, 325–26 (1989) (giving an overview of an 
economic analysis for copyright law). 
 241. See Carlin, supra note 5, at 104, 123 (noting that “economic incentives of intellectual 
property law” are the mode by which the Constitutional mandate to promote the arts is manifested); 
David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1806 (2013) (stating 
that the objective of copyright monopolies is to protect the potential for profits, which can be 
damaged by unauthorized secondary uses); Greenberg, supra note 13, at 1 (“[E]conomic incentives 
are at the heart of copyright law.”).  But see Badin, supra note 217, at 1670 (arguing that copyright 
law is not a reward but simply the means by which artists protect their work). 
 242. Landes & Posner, supra note 240, at 326. 
 243. See Timothy J. Brennan, Harper & Row v. The Nation, Inc.: Copyrightability and Fair 
Use, J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A., Oct.–July 1986, at 368, 375–76; Greenberg, supra note 13, at 
16 (stating that the Copyright Act has an “incentive structure” meant to promote the creation of 
“unique and original” art). 
 244. See Greenberg, supra note 13, at 30. Greenberg asserts that the economic justification for 
denying fair use for unpublished works is that the author has not yet reaped the benefits of their 
work.  Id.  However, once an author has commercially exploited their work there is no longer 
justification for maintaining exclusive copyrights.  Id. at 30–31; see also Gordon, supra note 239, 
at 1610. 
 245. Landes and Posner, supra note 240, at 325. 
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invention.246  Further, the public benefits from the uncompensated access to 
intellectual property.247 
B.  Proposing a Solution: Royalty System 
Economists argue that copyright law must consider the benefit of 
incentivizing artists to create works minus the cost of limiting access to a 
work.248  This cost-benefit analysis can be applied to appropriation artists in a 
simple two-step economic analysis after a determination has been made that a 
copyrighted work has been substantially used.249  This analysis would be applied 
only to appropriation art because of the distinctive way appropriation artists use 
copyrighted material.250 
The first step is to consider whether the alleged infringing artist used the 
copyrighted material for commercial purposes.251  Courts would consider only 
whether the artist profited from the sale, exhibition, or promotion of the work 
incorporating the copyrighted material.252  Only upon a finding that the use was 
commercial and therefore, profitable, would the court consider the second step 
in the analysis.253  By defining commercial use as profitability, this step 
considers the costs of limiting the artist’s access to intellectual property.  When 
                                                 
 246. Id. 
 247. See Fagundes, supra note 241, at 1811 (listing the benefits of efficient copyright 
infringement, which include a “richer cultural environment” and “inspiration” for new works); 
Gordon, supra note 239, at 1615 (noting the necessity of fair use when markets fail). 
 248. Landes and Posner, supra note 240, at 326; see also Carlin, supra note 5, at 133 (arguing 
that both pecuniary and moral considerations are at play when dealing with appropriation artists). 
 249. For purposes of determining substantial use courts could employ a de minimis analysis. 
See, e.g., Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that 
in order to determine fair use, the de minimis threshold must be decided as a matter of law and if a 
finding of de minimis copying is made the fair use analysis is unnecessary); Ringgold v. Black 
Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that de minimis determination is a 
threshold matter to determinations of fair use); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 
F.2d 73, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1943) (reasoning that the legal maxim, de minimis non curat lex, is a 
necessary part of any copyright infringement case because it must be shown that a substantial part 
of a work was used); see also PATRY, supra note 8, at § 2:6 (describing the pros and cons of using 
de minimis in conjunction with fair use). 
 250. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining the uniqueness of appropriation art 
and visual art generally). 
 251. Carlin, supra note 5, at 124.  Carlin argues that that “limited use of a copyrighted image 
in a work of art should not affect the value of that image.”  Id.  However this is issue is more 
complicated when numerous editions and “commercial merchandising” of the art occur.  Id.  Carlin 
also proposes that a distinction be made between an artist’s single use of a copyrighted image versus 
the multiple use of copyrighted images because the latter deserves higher scrutiny of the possible 
economic impact.  Id. at 136. 
 252. See Meyers, supra note 226, at 237–38; see also Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented 
Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1563 (2004) (suggesting that when copying 
is done in large amounts there will always be some type of economic injury to the copyright holder). 
 253. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (citing Judge Leval’s de-emphasis of 
transformative use when excessive taking occurs). 
2014] Applying Fair Use to Appropriation Art Economically 757 
artists do not profit from the work, the ability to borrow images would be 
unlimited.  This preserves the ability of small-time artists, recreational artists, 
and general users to access copyrighted material.254  However, artists seeking 
pecuniary gain from the use of copyrighted images would be subject to the 
protections that copyright offers.255 
The next consideration is the incentive that copyright holders should receive 
for their work.256  This analysis must consider the total amount of profits earned 
by the artists.  The copyright holder would then receive royalties in an amount 
based on the percentage of total profits.257  Royalties can offer a better solution 
for artists that are unable to identify the copyright holder or are prevented from 
purchasing licensing rights.258 
Some scholars argue that rigid application of exclusive copyrights stifles the 
very creativity the Copyright Act was meant to promote.259  However, creating 
a balance between granting fair use and upholding exclusive copyrights is 
necessary to ensure that creation continues.260  Applying economic analysis to 
                                                 
 254. Carlin, supra note 5, at 132 (declaring that difficulty arises when an artist’s rights are in 
direct conflict with another artist’s rights because an appropriation artist seeks to protect their work 
and be free to use copyrighted materials without providing compensation). 
 255. Meyers, supra note 226, at 238 (arguing that that artists should be free to express 
themselves by using images of their choosing but at the same time those artists must remember that 
“all artists require compensation”). 
 256. See id. at 237–38 (“Copyright should be concerned with compensation, not control.”). 
 257. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (stating 
that contemplation of the commercial use factor is meant to determine whether a secondary user is 
profiting from an original work in efforts to avoid paying “the customary price”); see also Gilbert, 
supra note 14 (reporting that several appropriation artists, including Koons and Prince have 
modified their behavior and now seek licensing agreements when they wish to incorporate 
copyrighted material into their artwork). 
 258. Unlike the variability of the damages awarded in the current scheme, the amount of 
royalties available under this proposal would always be the same percentage no matter the amount 
of copying.  This royalty scheme is similar to a compulsory license; however, compulsory licenses 
can prevent small time artists from accessing material.  See Deveny A. Deck, Fine Tuning Fair Use 
Music Parody: A Proposal for Reform in Acuff-Ross Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 71 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 59, 84 (1993).  Royalties that are capped at a relatively low percentage would preserve the 
majority of the appropriation artists profits and the ability of artists to access material when they 
would be otherwise unable to pay licensing fees.  See Fagundes, supra note 241, at 1823 (noting 
the high transaction costs that can accompany licensing fees).  However, the cost of a lawsuit that 
eventually leads to royalties could be similarly high in transaction costs, which is why it is important 
for courts to simplify and make fair use inquires consistent, discouraging potential litigants, 
facilitating even-playing-field settlement, and lessening the likelihood of appeal.  See Matthew Sag, 
Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 66 (2012). 
 259. See Greenberg, supra note 13, at 33 (arguing that appropriation artists suffer when 
exclusive copyrights are strictly enforced because appropriation regularly experiment with the 
traditional copyright conceptions of originality and creativity); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 
1170 (9th Cir. 2013) (arguing that copyright law should not be construed strictly because doing so 
would stifle creativity). 
 260. See supra part I.A. 
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fair use does not completely bar artists from accessing copyrighted material 
without compensating the rights holders.261 
This proposed fair use analysis for appropriation artists would prevent courts 
from deciding the aesthetic value of artwork.  By looking only at objective facts, 
the use of copyrighted work for profit, and the amount of those profits, judges 
can make decisions that are based on the facts of each case.  These decisions 
would result in consistent rulings that are not based on subjective criteria such 
as the visual aspects of each work as it appears to a specific judge.262 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As lawsuits involving visual artists become more prevalent and complicated, 
relying solely on the visual experience of a judge is increasingly problematic.  
Establishing a fair use analysis that allows for appropriated use absent 
substantial commercial use and profitability properly compensates and 
incentivizes creators to make original works.  Appropriation artists benefit from 
an analysis that is based solely on objective factors.  Judges would no longer 
need to rely on their experience with the artwork or form opinions based on their 
unrecognized biases.  Furthermore, a royalty system can offer artists the ability 
to use works that are otherwise unavailable.  Instead of risking the destruction 
of their art, artists can simply pay licensing fees or be subject to the royalty 
system, which merely takes into account a percentage of the profits made by the 
secondary user.  Fair use is an equitable principle that must be applied in a 
manner most consistent with the purpose of copyright law.  Finding a fair use 
solution that directly addresses the use of copyright material by visual 
appropriation artists, while at the same time allowing artistic innovation and 
freedom is necessary.  Instituting a royalty system is a fair use solution that best 
accomplishes this goal because it is most consistent with the economic principles 
underlying copyright protection. 
 
                                                 
 261. The most efficient way to gain access to copyrighted works is by seeking permission.  
INDE, supra note 17, at 4.  Permission, however, may be hard to secure when the artists seek to use 
the copyrighted material to further a political message as many appropriation artists have done. Id. 
 262. See supra notes 231–238 and accompanying text (describing judges’ instinctual resort to 
aesthetic reasoning in cases involving art). 
